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I. INTRODUCTION
At a fundamental level, pharmaceuticals serve two roles: both as a
cure for disease and as a product. As a cure for disease, a drug's value
cannot be quantified because it saves lives. As a product, profit analysis
shapes every step of a drug's progression to market. In least developed
nations the barriers to drug access are not solely economic. National
regulatory systems for market approval are being used to prevent
external pharmaceutical manufacturers from participating in a national
market. This article will address how the regulatory framework of
pharmaceutical registration may serve as a barrier to trade in drugs, how
these regulations affect developing countries who may want and/or need
to establish their own pharmaceutical industries, and how the World
Trade Organization's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade may
permit sanctions against such protectionist policies.
II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET STRUCTURE
Pharmaceuticals are unique products because all strata of society use
them, yet they represent large amounts of technical knowledge, economic
investment, and political controversy. For many reasons, drugs are expensive
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to make and expensive to obtain. In this section 1 will describe the general
factors which affect the pharmaceutical market, focus on the role that
regulatory requirements play in drug pricing, and discuss the challenges
drug pricing presents in lesser developed countries.
A. Factors in Drug Pricing
It is difficult to separate the costs regulatory requirements' impose on
the manufacture and marketing of drugs from other elements which
affect the pharmaceutical industry. These other elements include: intellectual
property rights 2 differential pricing structures, 3 compulsory and voluntary
licensing,4 parallel importation,5 exhaustion,6 and general expenses in capital
equipment and payroll that are inherent in any high tech industry. Economic
generalizations about the "pharmaceuticals market" are difficult to assess
because competition between drugs is "limited to a group of drugs that
I. Regulatory requirements may be described here as those standards that must be
met to sell a drug for human consumption. See discussion infra, Part Ill, for a more
precise definition of regulatory requirements.
2. Intellectual property is the intangible product of human activity. Frederick M.
Abbott et al., THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 21 (1999). An intellectual property right (IPR) is a right to authorize or
prevent others from acting in certain ways with respect to intellectual property. Id. at
22. Intellectual property rights, compulsory licensing, parallel importation, IPR exhaustion,
human rights and voluntary licensing have been more than adequately discussed elsewhere.
See e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical
Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317 (2005).
3. Differential Pricing is pricing based on regional markets which allows drugs to
be sold cheaply in low income countries while maintaining high prices in higher income
markets. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 193,
195 (2005).
4. A compulsory license is "a statutorily created license that allows certain people
to pay a royalty and use the [product covered by intellectual property] without the
[permission of the IPR holder]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).
5. See discussion of regulatory arbitrage for definitions, infra, Part Ill.
6. IPR exhaustion is the principle that once the owner of an intellectual-property
right has placed a product covered by that fight into the marketplace, the right to control
how the product is resold within that internal market is lost. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
614 (8th ed. 2004).
7. But Abbott comments that "competition is perhaps the most powerful policy
instrument to bring down drug prices for off-patent drugs. In the United States, when a
patent expires the average wholesale price falls to 60% of the branded drug's price when
there is just one competitor." Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health: Lighting A Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L.
469,471 (2002) [hereinafter Abbott, Doha].
are therapeutic substitutes for each other.",8  Therefore the amount of
money it takes to develop a particular type of drug may be relatively
constant, yet the amount of money a drug will sell for varies widely.
Drug pricing and profitability are drastically affected by the nature of the
particular drug. Whether the particular drug is a minor improvement
over the current treatment, a breakthrough drug in a known disease area,
or the first treatment available for a new disease affects that drug's
ultimate profitability.
9
All these elements contribute to high economic, social, and political
barriers to market entry and the high price a consumer actually pays.
The economic barriers begin with the high costs of research and
development [R&D] and are compounded by the high attrition of drugs
in the development stages. For instance, one successful drug must pay
the research costs of screening 10,000 early stage drugs.'" Only one out
of five drugs which enter clinical trials gets marketing approval in the
United States.' 2 At every step, potential compounds in the developed
8. Carston Fink, Patent Protection, Transnational Corporations, and Market
Structure: A Simulation Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH. 231, 251
(Carston Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). The market is also segmented into the
new drug market and the generic drug market. Though the burden of approving a new
drug is larger, and therefore more expensive over all, the regulatory requirements for an
already approved drug are similar. In Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, the WTO rejected stockpiling of patented products for commercial sale before
the end of the patent term, but allowed use and sale of patented chemicals if ultimate
intention was to be used in testing to be submitted to a regulatory agency for market
approval. In its argument, the Canadian government stated that the approval of an
already approved drug could take between 3 and 6 years, which includes proof of a
viable full production line and tests in humans. Panel Report, Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/SDll4/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter
Canada-Pharmaceuticals].
9. Fink, supra note 8, at 251. Fink also argues that the pharmaceutical sales
market is further segmented: "the market for antibiotics . . . can be considered as being
independent of the market for, say, cardiovascular drugs. Competition is limited to a
group of drugs that are therapeutic substitutes for each other." Id. at 231.
10. "The cost of launching one new drug (including absorbing the R&D costs of
drugs that fail to get approval) has increased significantly over recent decades from $138
million in the 1970s to more than $800 million now." PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF
AM., PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2005, 9 (Washington, DC: PhRMA, March
2005) [hereinafter PhRMA Profile].
11. Id. at 4, 12 n.9. Though it is debatable whether the United States of America is
a good representative of the drug market, what is known is that the global
pharmaceutical sales in 2004 were over 500 billion USD. Of this market, 88% is in
North America, Europe and Japan. Asia and Latin America combined contribute 11%
and Africa less than 1%. But if tablets were counted, middle income countries with large
populations would have a larger share based on the large volume/low cost markets for
drugs in these countries. Pharmaceuticals: Local Manufacturing, HNP Brief #3, 1
(World Bank, Mar. 2005) [hereinafter World Bank], available at http://www-wds.worldbank.
org/servlet/WDSIBankServlet?pcont-details&eid=000090341_20050503161513.
12. PhRMA Profile, supra note 10.
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world are evaluated for patentability and potential market share. 13 After
such a high investment in any given drug, individual companies jealously
guard their patent monopoly 4 in hopes of quickly recovering the costs of
research. '
5
Socially, the costs of health care and the burdens of disease induce
governments of developed nations and individual consumers to pay high
premiums for the newest and latest therapy. The popularity of these new
treatments raises the risks and rewards inherent in this industry by
creating a race to be the only drug approved for a niche market.
Furthermore, nationally imposed requirements to obtain drug regulatory
approval can affect the price both indirectly and directly. First, national
regulatory requirements affect the price indirectly through intellectual
property rights because the period during which a company can sell the
drug under the monopoly may be shortened by regulatory delays.
16
Second, national regulatory requirements affect the price directly because,
"adherence to [Good Manufacturing Practices] can add significantly to
investment and operating conditions of a manufacturing operation.'
7
The costs of regulatory compliance are also inflated by compliance with
the myriad regulatory schemes in both developed and lesser developed
nations. The regulatory barrier to market entry applies for each country
in which access is desired, so a drug that is acceptable in most of the
developed countries may encounter additional requirements if a
13. The issue of research gaps intersect here. Many argue that these market
evaluations indicate that it is un-profitable to spend the effort in finding a cure for many
of the diseases affecting developing nations, thereby ignoring serious diseases in favor of
more profitable minor ailments or lifestyle therapies. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach For University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005).
14. A patent right is "the right to exclude others from making, using, marketing,
selling, offering for sale, or importing an invention for a specified period (typically 20
years from the date of filing), granted by the federal government to the inventor if the
device or process is novel, useful, and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-103." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1150 (8th ed. 2004). A patent fight is also known as a "patent monopoly"
and the period of patent protection is often referred to as the "monopoly period."
15. Outterson observes that the patent monopoly in high income countries is rarely
unqualified; regulatory systems, health plans and government price setting all limit how
much a patented drug will sell for. Outterson, supra note 3, at 213-14.
16. In the United States, the Hatch-Waxman Act allows for the "repayment" of
lost time due to regulatory delays. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (2003), codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355
and 35 U.S.C.A. § 27 1(e).
17. World Bank, supra note 1I, at 2.
manufacturer chooses to market it in lesser developed or developing
countries and vice versa.
B. How Least Developed Nations are Affected by Drug Price
Like the pharmaceutical industry itself, drugs in the developing world
are characterized by high prices and complex relationships. The
combination of a high product price and high manufacturing price
effectively makes purchasing sufficient quantities of drugs from more
developed nations impossible for developing nations, and the current
solutions to increase access are inadequate. 8 The HIV/AIDs epidemic
has brought the cost of drugs to the attention of international bodies,
including the WTO. 19 Through the TRIPS agreement 2° and the Doha
Declaration,2' the WTO tried to increase access to drugs by lowering the
portion of the price of drugs directly related to the patent monopoly by
allowing compulsory licensing. The threat of compulsory licensing has
22lowered the price of essential drugs to developing nations, but many
argue that the price is still "high in relation to available incomes.
23
Furthermore, compulsory licenses are disfavored by the drug's patent
18. For example, a research gap exists where little private research is done on
diseases pertinent to least developed nations, since the return of investment on those
diseases is limited to income from populations in least developed nations, and not the
diseases which dominate developed nations. Conversely, an access gap is one where
individual nations have little or no access to drugs, due to pricing or other market
mechanisms. See Kapczynski, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Annex IC, Article 31, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April, 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
TRIPS allowed compulsory licensing based on government need. Under TRIPS art 31
governments of developing nations may make, use, or sell a patented product in
opposition to the patent holder's wishes by invoking the compulsory license provision.
Id. A member country is charged a "reasonable royalty" to exploit the patent, but that
value is theoretically much lower than the market value for the drug.
21. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2003) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
Decision of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003). Implementation of the Doha
Declaration permitted importation of patented drugs from other nations if the developing
nation requesting the drug was incapable of producing it themselves.
22. To take HIV/AIDS as an example, the cost of patented AntiRetroviral
Combination Therapies (ARVs) was more than $10,000/ year, where the generic cost "as
little as $168" per year. See Kapczynski, supra note 13. See also WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE (Dec. 2004), available at www.unaids.
org/wad2004/EPI 1204_pdf en/EpiUpdate04_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
23. Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property Rights
and What Have We Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS
FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1, 10 (Carston Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
See also Kapczynski, supra note 13.
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holders, because they do not receive their maximum profit from a
compulsory license, only a "reasonable royalty."2 4 Compulsory licensing
for developing nations is disfavored because it does not create incentives
for developing nations to find permanent domestic solutions to their
public health crises.25 Additionally, lesser developed nations have contracted
away their compulsory licensing privileges through bilateral agreements
to obtain concessions on completely different trade issues.26
Drug pricing policy in the developed world affects drug pricing in the
developing world. For example, Outterson argues that, though Anti-
Retroviral treatments (ARVs), the main therapy for HIV infection, were
not patented in most of Sub-Saharan Africa during the past fourteen
years, the real barrier to ARV access was the cost of drugs in the
developed world.2 7 The supply of ARVs to the developing countries had
to originate outside their borders, because they did not have the ability to
manufacture their own.2 These external prices, inflated by patent
monopolies, limited the scale on which medications were manufactured
and the threat of litigation for patent infringement deterred generics
manufacturers from exporting the drugs to Sub-Saharan Africa, thereby
cutting off an adequate supply of drugs.
29
24. TRIPS art 3 1. The patent holder risks losing a significant market for their drug
and the related profits by compulsory licensing.
25. When developing nations have the ability to obtain pharmaceuticals at
drastically lowered prices through compulsory licensing, they "reap the full benefits
from lower prices ... yet the costs in terms of diminished research incentives are largely
externalized to the developed world." Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing
Countries and the Doha "Solution, "3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 49 (2002).
26. There are allegations of unfair licenses and bilateral agreements between
individual nations where the bilateral trade agreement implements stronger intellectual
property protection than what signatories to TRIPS are bound by. There is concern
because some believe these "TRIPS Plus" provisions are the product of unequal
bargaining power between nations. See Abbott, Doha, supra note 7. See also Access to
Medicines At Risk Across the Globe: What to Watch Out For in Free Trade Agreements
with the United States, Briefing Note (Mdecins Sans Fronti~res' Campaign for Access
to Essential Medicines) (May 2005).
27. Outterson comments that though Brazil and India were capable of
manufacturing and exporting ARVs to Sub-Saharan Africa, any efforts were blocked by
dispute resolution in the WTO. Outterson, supra note 3, at 256.
28. Id.
29. Id. See also Mattias Ganslandt et al., Developing and Distributing Essential
Medicines to Poor Countries: The DEFEND Proposal, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 207, 210 (Carston Fink &
Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005). "Pharmaceutical firms chronically undersupply the
medicinal needs of poor countries, partly because of limited exclusivity in rights,
including the need to restrain parallel trade." Id.
To increase access to pharmaceuticals in the near future, alternatives
to manipulation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) should be analyzed.
Encouraging lesser developed nations to form local drug industries is an
attractive alternative to compulsory licensing. Advantages of a local drug
market, especially in AIDS/HIV afflicted countries, include the potential
for lower drug prices, strengthened political support for treatment programs,
mobilization of resources to overcome health system bottlenecks and
unification of political leaders to fight the epidemic. a Ironically, some
lesser developed nations are now providing generic drugs to the least
developed nations under compulsory licenses because they were politically
and economically able to enter the market.3' However, it is unrealistic to
believe that the least developed nations have the infrastructure to create
viable drug manufacturing plants overnight. Though each individual
nation may not be able to support pharmaceutical manufacturing, Abbott
suggests that there is promise for "regional arrangements in which facilities
and related infrastructure can be allocated in a way that provides benefits"
to all countries in the region. 2 In this manner, one country may provide
research facilities, another may provide manufacturing ability and packaging,
and the staff may come from any of the surrounding countries. In a
continent of geographically tied regions, this supply of drugs may be
sufficient to treat the entire region.3
Market access to pharmaceuticals has been thoroughly discussed in
the framework of WTO Agreements, through the TRIPS Agreement and
IPRs, parallel importation, IPR exhaustion, human rights and voluntary
licensing.34 This article will focus on the additional burden that regulatory
requirements to attaining drug approval present to developing nations
and how these laws should be addressed by the WTO.
30. World Bank, supra note 11, at 3. Government action to create a new or
improved regulatory system focuses attention on the weaknesses of the current system,
and will raise awareness about national health concerns. Increased sensitivity about
health related issues common to a region may serve as a ground to foster cooperation
between nations which previously have acted at cross-purposes or in direct competition
in the past. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean
Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 393
(2005) [hereinafter Abbott, Hydra].
31. See Prognosis: Short-Term Relief Long-Term Pain The Future of Generic
Medicines Made in India, Briefing Note (Mrdecins Sans Frontires' Campaign for
Access to Essential Medicines) (Apr. 2005).
32. Frederick Abbott, Hydra, supra note 30, at 419. But Abbott concedes that
nations that will need a long-term large supply of medicines, such as ARVs, should
create local production to prevent landing in an economically and politically vulnerable
position on all trade fronts. Id.
33. Id.
34. See generally Abbott, Doha, supra note 7 (containing background information
on the costs of pharmaceuticals and WTO framework).
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I11. INTRODUCTION TO REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
A. What are Pharmaceutical Regulatory Requirements?
Pharmaceutical regulatory requirements are the testing procedures
required by a national agency to market a drug in that country.
Regulatory requirements are imposed on researchers and manufacturers
before and after the drug is approved to be sold in a country. Regulatory
systems may have at least some of the following components at some
level: pre-approval regulatory requirements, such as data from preclinical
tests, the components and composition of the drug, animal tests for efficacy
and safety, pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic data, clinical results,
manufacturing, processing and packaging information, and samples of the
drugs with its labeling.35 Post-approval regulatory requirements consist
of post-marketing surveillance of the approved drug through spontaneous
reports and continuing clinical studies, inspections of the laboratories
and manufacturing plants responsible for making the drug, and validation of
the manufacturing processes up to commercial production and over
time.36
Often it is difficult to determine exactly how much testing is needed
on a pharmaceutical before that drug is considered "safe" for consumers.
Janet Woodcock, former Director of the U.S. Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, describes the need to balance the amount of time it takes
to approve a drug, the completeness of the testing requirements, the
changing demands of generic acceptance, and international harmonization.
37
She notes that ultimately:
Clinical testing-the premarket testing of drugs-will not detect all the
problems. It just can't.., because some of the events are rare ... and some
problems with drugs are caused by the way they're used outside of the
parameters for which they're approved ... also sometimes we encounter errors
in the use of the drug.
38
Given this uncertainty about whether even the most rigorous regulatory
schemes will detect adverse drug events, it is understandable that each
35. E.g., UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FROM TEST TUBE TO
PATIENT: IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS, 33 (1999) [hereinafter FDA]
(available from author) (2006 edition available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/
testtubetopatient/default.htm) (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
36. Id. at 46.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 11.
country has developed its own testing requirements based on its own
national experience.
National law determines the extent of regulatory requirements, which
differ from nation to nation. In Canada-Pharmaceuticals, for example,
differences between national regulatory laws were highlighted when,
spurred by Canada's more lenient regulatory laws, the United States
and the European Union brought a complaint against Canada.39 The
parties alleged that Canada's regulatory law violated TRIPS by
allowing generic drugs to obtain regulatory marketing approval during
the patent term. 40  The parties also objected to Canada law which
allowed the manufacture and stockpiling of a supply of marketable
drugs to be sold to consumers the minute the patent term had expired.
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body [DSB] concluded that the TRIPS
agreement allowed generic manufacturers to make and sell patented
drugs before the patent term expired for regulatory submission only but
not for stockpiling. This case highlighted the Canadian government's
policy of minimizing the cost of drugs to consumers, as embodied
through their regulatory scheme.
B. Harmonization of Regulatory Requirements and
the International Arena
International organizations may help establish a consensus for
pharmaceutical regulatory requirements, but these organizations are
predominantly created by developed nations, to meet the needs of
developed nations.41  The current global standard for pharmaceutical
39. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, upra note 8, at IV D (4) (e).
40. Id. Incidentally, Canada also argued that the United States' more restrictive
regulatory requirements were a technical barrier to trade. Id. The WTO panel refused to
address the issue as to whether a pharmaceutical regulatory requirement was a technical
barrier to trade, and decided under the TRIPS Agreement that manufacturing for
submission to the regulatory agency was allowed while stockpiling for sale was not. Id.
41. Though, the WTO's Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade requires that
"Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure
that intemational standardizing bodies and international systems for conformity assessment
are organized and operated in a way which facilitates active and representative
participation of relevant bodies of all Members, taking into account the special problems
of developing country Members," the evidence supporting the proposition that developed
countries make allowances for developing countries tends to be related to technology
transfer through publication of methods and standards. Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994), Annex IA-Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, 12.5 [hereinafter TBT]. Additionally, developed nations
view the non-participation in the chemicals markets by developing nations as de facto.
The EU's recent REACH proposal, requiring universal high-level testing of all chemicals
imported or made in the EU, argues that the proposal will in fact assist developing
countries because:
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manufacturing is the Standard of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP),
developed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 42
The International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH)
brings together the regulatory authorities of Europe, Japan and the United
States, and may be the next gold standard for pharmaceutical regulations.43
Registration requirements under the ICH are more stringent than those
for GMP, and most small-scale local manufacturers are not able to meet
GMP standards. 4  Furthermore, the ICH system is intimately tied to
industry, the United States FDA is the regulatory lead and United States
industry lead is the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA).45
Another standardizing organization is the International Standardization
Organization (ISO), a non-governmental body which establishes and
disseminates technical regulations for all areas of trade through national
representatives. 46 This organization is prominently featured in the WTO
agreements, and acts as a repository for notifications received under the
TBT.47 The ISO suggests that published regulations assist the transfer of
[M]any developing countries do not have adequate legislation, administrative
capacity or infrastructure to ensure the safe use of chemicals .... Developing
countries are mostly importers and not exporters of chemicals. The testing
requirements in the EU will ensure that imported chemicals, which constitute
the large majority of chemicals used in these countries, have been evaluated.
COMMISSION FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER: STRATEGY FOR A FUTURE
CHEMICALS POLICY, 10 (2001), http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sgadoc?smartapi!celexapi!
prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=52001 DC0088&model=guichett) (last visited
Feb. 3, 2007) [hereinafter REACH]. The proposal has been discussed in the WTO Committee
on Technical Barriers to Trade where Singapore, on behalf of the ASEAN countries, objected
to the REACH proposal, stating that "compliance in itself was seen as so onerous as to
constitute a significant trade barrier, particularly for developing countries and Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which might not have sufficient resources and expertise
to meet the proposed requirements." Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, G/TBT/M/33,
33 (Aug. 31, 2001). The REACH proposal will be in force in June 2007, and the
program will begin to require registration for large quantity imports and certain other
chemicals in 2010, though discussion in the WTO continues, available at http://europa.
eu.int/ comm/enterprise/reach/overview en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
42. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 210-26 (2005).
43. ICH Home Page, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-I.html.
44. World Bank, supra note 11, at 2.
45. David P. Kelly et al., Promoting Public Health and Protecting Consumers in a
Global Economy. An Overview of HHS/FDA 's International Activities, 60 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 339 (2005).
46. ISO IN BRIEF, www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isoinbrief/isoinbrief.html.
47. TBT, annex 3C.
technology to less developed nations because they disclose technology
and methodologies.4 8 The ISO states that 146 of its members are developing
nations, yet the decisional committees primarily consist of national
standardization organizations from developed countries or countries
which arguably should not hold lesser developed status.49
Pharmaceutical regulatory requirements are pertinent to the international
drug trade because importing countries require that drug imports comply
with their national regulatory requirements or an acknowledged equivalent.5°
For instance, Outterson points out that the U.S. Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act (FDCA) is a non-tariff barrier to international trade because it does
not allow drugs to be imported into the United States without approval
from the FDA.51 However, it is unclear that this barrier to trade is
unjustified in light of fears over widespread counterfeiting.52 It is clear
that many countries require approval by their own agency before a drug
can be sold in that country.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage: Maximizing Profits Across
Regulatory Systems
Like picking a forum to bring suit in, companies and consumers can
pick where to market and purchase their drugs based on the most
favorable regulatory regime. In regulatory arbitrage, both pharmaceutical
manufacturers and consumers evaluate regulatory systems to determine
the most profitable environment to make and buy pharmaceuticals.
Outterson argues that when one state imposes particularly restrictive
48. ISO ACTION PLAN FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2005-2010, 2, http://www.iso.
org/iso/en/aboutiso/actionplan/actionplan.html.
49. Http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/isostructure/COUNCIL.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2007). That said, it may be unrealistic to expect that a least developed nation
would have the resources to spend on secondary or tertiary international non-governmental
organizations.
50. Outterson, supra note 3, at 213.
51. Id.
52. There is increasing concern over counterfeiting in the international market.
Studies from countries like Brazil, Nigeria and South-East Asia show inadequate levels
of active ingredient in the supply of drugs in the product pool. In particular, a Haitian
study connected an outbreak of kidney failure to the presence of diethylene glycol in
acetaminophen syrup given to children. Stephanie Barbosa, Implementation of the Doha
Declaration: Its Impact on American Pharmaceuticals, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 205, 226-29
(2004). It is clear that safety is of paramount importance, but what is unclear is whether
certain safety precautions do not have an additional and alternate purpose. The serious
disease burdens that particular nations carry might justify a lower standard for particular
types of drugs, such as ARVs for treatment of critical HIV/AIDS patients. The FDA has
recognized that experimental medical treatments for fatal diseases may be given to
critical populations through an accelerated approval program which grants conditional
approval so long as surrogate endpoints are met, but that rationale has not been extended
to entire nations. FDA, supra note 35, at 8.
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regulatory requirements on an industry, as the United States does, the
industry (or its consumers) may relocate to a state with less restrictive
regulations, inducing the first state to relax its regulatory system5 3 He
argues that the pharmaceutical arbitrage across the U.S.-Canadian border,
spurred by government price controls in Canada, encouraged U.S. consumers
to "import" the Canadian regulatory system of price fixing into the American
pharmaceuticals market. 54 This "importation" induced Congress to re-
evaluate its position on foreign drug imports, though it declined to change
it.55
There is a close connection between intellectual property rights and
the chosen regulatory scheme. For instance, clinical data generated from
trials required by national regulatory agencies may be protected by some
form of national IPRs, placing the regulatory authority in a position to
protect IPRs.56  Industry arbitrage may be based on a country's IPRs.
Maskus notes that strengthening IPR protection indicates to transnational
corporations that the country is open to foreign direct investing (FDI), by
creating trade liberal, transparent, production and marketing controls. 57
But IPRs are only5 one of many variables that determine the attractiveness of
an FDI location.
53. Outterson, supra note 3, at 281.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of
Data Submitted For The Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69 (2002).
Correa subsequently argues that intellectual property protection for clinical data should
be carefully scrutinized to support the individual nation's needs. Id. He discusses one
position where IPRs are not given to clinical data because, "the registration of products
should not erect barriers to otherwise legitimate competition" and should instead
"promote price competition and access to more affordable medicines." Id.
57. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 41, 62 (Carston Fink &
Keith E. Markus eds., 2005). When a transnational company establishes a wholly owned
subsidiary in a foreign country, it is considered Foreign Direct Investment. Id. FDI is
generally considered to be beneficial to a developing country because it increases the
transfer of technology directly, by employing and training local nationals, but the
economic benefit a country receives may be limited due to the trans-national
corporations engaging in abusive practices such as restrictive licensing conditions and
technology grant backs, tied sales or engaging in price discrimination and predation
against local firms. Id. at 68.
58. Fink & Maskus, supra note 23, at 7, commenting on Maskus, supra note 57.
Fink comments, "a poor country hoping to attract inward FDI would be better advised to
improve its overall investment climate and business infrastructure than to strengthen its
Industry decisions about whether to locate research and manufacturing
capability in a host country ultimately affect both regulatory requirements
and the strength of intellectual property protection adopted in a given
country. 59 Unfortunately, manufacturing and trade in pharmaceuticals
has been associated with nepotism and corruption in some countries with
less established governments. National regulatory agencies have been
directly implicated; "manufacturers may try to influence regulatory decisions
or get preferential market access in exchange for favors.' 60 This sort of
relationship exemplifies a different type of regulatory arbitrage, one that
does not encourage FDI and technology transfer, and encourages the
exploitation of disorganized governments and consumers. Clear and fair
marketing regulatory requirements, like the establishment of an intellectual
property regime, may indicate a healthy political system and business
infiastructure, thereby encouraging investment or business in that country.6'
But, like inadequate IPRs, inadequate or protectionist regulatory schemes
may induce corporations and consumers to look elsewhere to spend their
money.
The test case discussed in part V exemplifies the challenges with
identifying and combating potentially protectionist regulatory regimes.
However the group which lose the most are the consumers, who can not
buy their drugs from other countries.
IV. PHARMACEUTICALS AND THE WTO FRAMEWORK
A. Non-Economic Barriers to Trade and the WTO Framework
The WTO was formed in 1995 with the purpose of enabling international
trade to the economic benefit of all nations. The WTO creates and
administers binding international rules of trade and resolves disputes
between countries based on the agreements. The Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization incorporates all the Multilateral
Trade Agreements as a single, integrated instrument.62 The General
patent regime sharply. ... However, IPRs are quite important for multinational firms
making location decisions among middle-income countries." Id.
59. Abbott, Hydra, supra note 30, at 410. (Describing how the local and international
pharmaceutical industry in South Africa prevented the passage of legislation designed to
facilitate lower prices for patented medicines and in doing so distorted the policies of the
South African government.).
60. World Bank, supra note 11, at 3 (suggesting that regulatory decisions may not
always be made solely with the interests of the nation in mind).
61. Fink & Maskus, supra note 23.
62. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization Article 11.2 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization].
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Agreement includes an obligation that Members will ensure that their
respective governments' "laws, regulations and administrative procedures"
are in conformity with their obligations under the WTO.63
The WTO Agreement promotes free trade by creating and applying
rules regarding transparency of trade, harmonization of international
trade standards, and non-discriminatory trade practices through its Most
64Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment. MFN requirements provide that a
Member State cannot discriminate in how it treats goods coming from
different Member States.65 Similarly, national treatment requires Member
States to treat products imported from any other Member State the same
as it treats like products within its own jurisdiction. The WTO also
provides an international forum for dispute settlement.6 7
The WTO has three major documents which cover discriminatory
trade practices related to human health: the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994 (GATT),6 8 the Agreement on Sanitary and Phystosanitary
Measures (SPS) 69 and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT). 70 Through these agreements, the WTO not only presents broad
theories of competition law, but allows member nations to regulate their
own markets. By requiring each nation's government to abide by the
broad principles of the WTO agreements or face sanctions, the WTO
63. Id. at art. XV1.4.
64. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994, Articles I and III of GATT 1994 [hereinafter GATT].
65. GATT art. 1, as summarized by David P. Fidler, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PUBLIC HEALTH: MATERIALS ON AND ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL HEALTH JURISPRUDENCE 219-
21 (2000).
66. GATT art. III, as summarized by Fidler, supra note 65.
67. See www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/displ e.htm (for a summary on
dispute resolution). See also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993 Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
68. GATT, supra note 64.
69. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), Annex IA-Agreement on Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures, (1994) [hereinafter SPS].
70. TBT, supra note 41. Competition is a major issue with TRIPS as well, but it is
argued that TRIPS is ill-equipped to regulate competition on a worldwide scale and that
any mandatory competitive provisions should be established by the entire WTO rather
than by the council on TRIPS alone. Josef Drexl, International Competition Law-A
Missing Link between TRIPS and Transfer of Technology, WIPO/WTO Meeting of
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2003, http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/
meetings/2003/wipowto/wipo wto 03_program.html.
ensures that the industries in member nations are regulated by those
broad principles as well.
71
Disputes involving pharmaceuticals or human health have been brought
under all three provisions. Though all three provisions may apply to any
given human health fact pattern, the issue of how national regulations
regarding drug regulatory approval should be analyzed has not been
settled. This article will suggest why protectionist regulatory requirements
for pharmaceuticals should be addressed under the TBT, and will
analyze the WTO framework for applying these provisions. Finally,
there is a request for dispute settlement brought by India pending in the
WTO, which argues that Argentina's pharmaceutical regulatory requirements
involved in testing of pharmaceuticals are protectionist in nature and
violate the TBT. This article will analyze how the WTO might rule on
this dispute in part V.
B. GA TT Most Favoured Nation Treatment
MIFN treatment and national treatment are the heart of nondiscriminatory
trade law. MFN status requires that "any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties. 72 Article I. 1 prohibits both
defacto and dejure discrimination, implicating laws which on their face
are non-discriminatory. 73 National treatment provides that "products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin., 74 Like products
under this provision are considered to be "products that are in ... a
competitive relationship." 75 This competitive relationship is analyzed
71. Agreement Establishing the WTO art. XVI:4. Drexl argues that allowing the
WTO members to police competition in their own markets allows richer countries to rely
on functioning competition law systems to protect their own markets, while new
economies not only have to draft the competition law but face issues such as rejection of
the competition idea among local firms, authorities and the general public, problems of
corruption, and the inability to establish an independent judiciary to enforce the laws.
Additionally, competition authorities in smaller countries may not "dare act against large
multinationals if the latter have effectuated considerable investment in a given host
country." Drexl, supra note 70.
72. GATT art. 1.1.
73. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, 78, WT/DS 1 39/AB/R (31 May 2000).
74. GATT art. III. 4.
75. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos Containing Products, 101, WT/DS135/ABiR (Mar. 12, 2001).
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with "(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end-
uses of the products; (iii) ... consumers' perceptions and behaviour- in
respect to the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products"
in mind.7 6
C. The Purpose of the TBT
The purpose of the TBT is to assist all nations, and particularly
Developing Nations, in accessing technical markets. The Preamble
states that the TBT is meant to "ensure that technical regulations and
standards ... do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade."
To meet that goal, the TBT also supports the promulgation and enforcement
of international standards, international conformity assessment systems,
and the promotion of technology transfer.7 7 The TBT addresses the
complex relationship between national regulatory systems, market access
and WTO obligations.7 8 Through the TBT, the WTO tries to balance
international trade liberalization with members' right to implement rational
regulatory policies. 79 Access to a particular country's market depends
on the level of technical regulation applying in that territory, restrained
by the provisions of the TBT non-discrimination clauses.
80
The TBT is designed to invalidate technical regulations which were
created to serve a protectionist interest. In the public health arena, the
WTO has been likened to the U.S. Commerce Clause, in that it restricts a
member state from exercising absolute autonomy over trade practices,
including those involved with world health. 81 This analogy is reinforced
by the legislative nature of the WTO agreements, which balance free
trade against state sovereignty.82 If that analogy holds true, the TBT is
analogous to a codification of the United States' Dormant Commerce
76. Id.
77. TBT pmbl.
78. Paul Beynon, Community Mutual Recognition Agreements, Technical Barriers
to Trade and the WTO's Most Favoured Nation Principle, 28(2) EUR. L. REV. 231, 236
(2003).
79. Id. "The adoption per se of technical regulations affects the degree of market
access granted by one country to another." Id.
80. The TBT is in addition to GATT non-discrimination clauses. Any complaint
brought under TBT is likely to be brought under GATT's non-discrimination clauses, in
particular the public health exemption found in GATT art. 27 (b).
81. David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health 's "New World
Order, " 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 247, 278 (2004).
82. Id.
Clause.83 Like the Dormant Commerce Clause, the TBT seeks to prevent
state regulations which place an undue burden on interstate commerce
and provides a framework for examining whether the regulation's
purpose justifies the burden it places on international trade. 84
At its heart, the TBT prohibits protectionism, but it does not prohibit all
protectionist acts. Products imported from another Member's territory
"shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other
country." 85 If regulations are considered to be discriminatory, they must
face a least restrictive means test, that "trade regulations shall not be
more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. 86
The ultimate analysis of pharmaceuticals under the TBT begins with two
major threshold questions: does the TBT even apply to pharmaceuticals
and if so, are regulatory requirements technical regulations subject to the
TBT analysis?
D. The Scope of the TBT as Applied to Pharmaceuticals
Drug regulatory requirements are always ostensibly applied to ensure
safety, but whether the TBT applies to these requirements is a question
83. The dormant commerce clause grows out of the power to regulate interstate
commerce granted to the legislature through U.S. CONST. art. 1 §8. The first inquiry is
whether the law affects interstate commerce. If so, the law examined to determine
whether it discriminates against out of state competitors. A law may be facially
discriminatory or facially neutral but discriminatory in intent or effect. A discriminatory
law will likely be struck down as unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause.
If a law is not discriminatory, the court will balance a state's justification for the law
against the burden the law imposes on out of state competitors. The court also examines
how effective the means used by the state are to achieve their purported purpose. See,
e.g., S. Carolina St. Highway Dep't v. Bamwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510
(1938). But see, Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International
Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 23 (1999) [hereinafter Sykes, Protectionism] (disagreeing
that there is any balancing of interests in the WTO TBT analysis because those who wish
to have protectionist policies may do so as long as scientific evidence supports the
regulatory policy and the least restrictive trade measures are employed).
84. The difficulties with this type of analysis are highlighted by Klug, who
suggests that international agreements which purport in their preambles (the "soft law")
to support human rights policies such as access to pharmaceuticals have noble goals, but
that the specific treaty provisions (the "hard law") do not necessarily aptly serve these
goals because ultimately the treaties are designed to protect the property rights of
individuals against "attempts by national governments to address pressing social needs.
Heinz Klug, Access to Essential Medicines-Promoting Human Rights Over Free Trade
and Intellectual Property Claims, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 481, 482 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005).
85. TBT art. 2.1. This standard also applies to government mandated testing.
86. TBT art. 2.2.
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of interpretation between the TBT and the SPS Agreement.8 7 The TBT
explicitly does not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures as
defined in Annex A of the SPS Agreement. 8 The reference to the SPS
Agreement recognizes that the purposes of the TBT and the SPS
Agreement are similar, but that regulations under the SPS were designed
to "protect domestic agricultural sectors," where the TBT applies to all
forms of technical regulations, regardless of their legislative purpose.89
Since drug regulations do not serve to protect agriculture, they fail to
meet the objective of the SPS, but the application of the SPS may
nonetheless be broader than its stated purpose.
A sanitary or phytosanitary measure is defined by the WTO to be one
that was taken to protect human life from "additives, contaminants, toxins,
or disease-causing organisms in their food beverages [or] feedstuffs" or
from "plant- or animal-carried diseases." 90 This "test" for applicability
of the TBT or the SPS is only a legal distinction, in that "regulations
being developed by governments do not always treat safety and quality
issues separately."9  Where a regulation addresses both safety and
quality, the safety element would be handled under the SPS and the
quality element would be handled under the TBT.92 The troubling issue is
that, with pharmaceuticals, the quality requirements frequently are issues
of safety.93 To confuse matters further, notification of regulations under
the TBT and the SPS may be sent to the Secretariat, which then
disseminates them to the participating nations, so realistically a notification
could be copied verbatim and sent to the Secretariat twice.94 Though
87. See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
WTO AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH-A JOINT STUDY BY THE WHO AND WTO
SECRETARIAT, Press/310 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres02 e/
pr3 10_e.htm [hereinafter WTO/WHO]. The "least restrictive" analysis is exemplified in
Sykes, Protectionism, supra note 83, at 21. He suggests that prohibiting regulatory
protectionism through agreements is most efficient if the agreement requires broad
regulations based on product performance rather than product design. Id
88. TBTart. 1.5.
89. WTO/WHO, supra note 87, at 34.
90. Id. at 36, Box 1.
91. Id. at n.7.
92. Id.
93. FDA, supra note 35.
94. The TBT requires that if the nation has opted into the ISO, then regulations are
sent there. Otherwise they are sent to the Secretariat. The ISO is a repository and policy
making body which promulgates international technological standards, but also accepts
notification of an individual nation's adopted technological standard. TBT annex 3C. A
standard, as opposed to a technical regulation, is defined in the TBT as "a document
approved by a recognized body that provides for common and repeated use, rules
there is confusion regarding which agreement a pharmaceutical might fall
under, the language of and the references to the SPS state that it applies
to human health issues related to food additives.95 Because pharmaceuticals
are not food and do not serve the SPS's policies of harmonizing
agricultural standards to facilitate commerce, they should not be analyzed
under the SPS.
Even if drug regulatory requirements do not fall under the SPS, these
requirements may not fall under the TBT if they are neither a technical
regulation nor a conformity assessment procedure. A technical regulation is
defined in the TBT as a "document which lays down product characteristics
or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory." 96 Technical
regulations may have both prohibitive and permissive elements,97 and
the product or group of products to which it applies must be identifiable
from the technical regulation.9" Compliance is measured through "conformity
assessment procedures" or quality control testing. A conformity assessment
procedure is defined as "any procedure used, directly or indirectly,
to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or
standards are fulfilled." 99 Under the TBT, either technical regulations or
conformity assessment procedures can be found to be an unnecessary
barrier to trade.
National regulatory requirements may be divided into technical regulations
and conformity assessment procedures. Based on the definitions in the
TBT for technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures
recited above, the standards for toxicity, efficacy, other clinically related
data, weights, labeling and packaging are likely technical regulations
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes... with which compliance
is not mandatory." TBT annex I. Definition 2. Under the TBT notifications go to the
ISO, but the ISO has technical groups for food products, chemistry, laboratory
equipment, clinical laboratory testing, and in vitro diagnostic test systems, evaluation of
medical devices, and health informatic systems (which covers standardization of data
reporting), http://www.iso.org/iso/en/stdsdevelopment/tc/tclist/. It is notable that the
United States requested dispute resolution against the European Communities regarding
growth hormones in beef under both the TBT and the SPS. Panel Report, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/R
(Aug. 18, 1997). The European Communities agreed that the disputed measure fell
within the SPS, and so the issue was explicitly excluded from analysis under the TBT.
Id. at 4.2.4.4.
95. SPS annexA.1.
96. TBT art. 15.5 annex I definition 1.
97. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-
Asbestos].
98. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines,
WT/DS231/AB/R, at paras. 176, 180 (Sept. 26, 2002).
99. TBT annex I definition 3.
578
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while the manufacturing and testing evaluations are probably conformity
assessment procedures. GMP standards apply solely to pharmaceutical
production. 0 0 Though the general field of pharmaceuticals is large, it is
sufficient to differentiate them from other products, like electronics.'0 '
GMP regulations are a procedure that attempts to ensure that manufacturing
processes are capable of consistent manufacture of pharmaceuticals, that
all steps in the manufacturing process are clearly defined, reviewed and
validated, including the calibration of all machinery involved and the
adequate training of employees.' 0 2 Additionally, GMP requires retrievable
records guaranteeing the quality of every step of the process and product
up to the time of sale. It also requires that complaints are examined to
find the cause and that the appropriate measures are taken to address
them. 10 3 In international trade, conformity assessment procedures are of
primary importance because nations require compliance with their own
technical regulations to access their markets, and compliance is established
through these procedures.1
0 4
Assessing pharmaceutical regulatory requirements, it is clear that they
represent either technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures.
100. European GMP Standard, EudraLex, THE RULES GOVERNING MEDICINAL PRODUCTS
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, VOLUME 4: EU GUIDELINES TO GOOD MANUFACTURING
PRACTICE MEDICINAL PRODUCTS FOR HUMAN AND VETERINARY USE Part 1 Chapter 1:




104. Discussion of a new regime for chemicals testing before importation under the
EU's REACH proposal at the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade supports this
conclusion. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade-Minutes of the Meeting of 1
July 2004, G/TBT/M/33 (July 1, 2004). REACH would require that enterprises that
manufacture or import more than one ton of a chemical per year register it in a central
database. Any substances which have a production volume of more than 100 tons would
need to get those chemicals evaluated by the European authority. Lastly, specific
permission would need to be sought and granted to use chemicals with known hazardous
properties. Unlike earlier regulations, this would be required for both new and previously
existing substances, rather than only new substances. This system was created by the
European Community in 2001 and presented to the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade in 2003 for comment. See REACH, supra note 41. Since the presentation of this
proposal, multiple nations have expressed concern that though the regulation is non-
discriminatory in appearance, it could be discriminatory in practice. Committee on
Technical Barriers to Trade-Minutes of the Meeting of I July 2004, G/TBT/M/33 (July
1, 2004). They also suggest that non-EU producers and suppliers would bear an added
burden with compliance. Id. Finally, the requirements were seen as so onerous that
compliance was considered a significant trade barrier for developing countries, "who
might not have sufficient resources and expertise to meet the proposed requirements." Id.
It is also clear that they fall under the TBT because they affect one or
more given products, specify technical characteristics of the products
which allow them to be marketed in the Member country, and compliance
with these requirements is mandatory.
E. General Analysis Under the TBT
1. Notice: Does the Regulation Deviate from
International Standards?
Overall, the TBT encourages nations to adopt internationally-recognized
technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures. 0 5 "Members
shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical
regulations of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their
own, provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil
the objectives of their own regulations."' 0 6 Individual nations are allowed
to create their own regulations when there are no internationally recognized
ones or they choose to deviate from the international standard to satisfy a
legitimate objective.' 0 7 When they do, they are required to notify the
Secretariat and the ISO.
08
Similarly, analysis of conformity assessment procedures begins with a
determination of whether or not the procedure complies with the "relevant
guides or recommendations issued by international standardizing bodies."' 0 9
If the procedure deviates, then the member is supposed to use the parts
of the regulation which are relevant and appropriate, unless they deviate
for reasons such as the "protection of human health or safety.''1° Like
technical regulations, notification is also required if the deviation has a
significant effect on trade."'
2. Notice: Does the Regulation Have a
Significant Effect on Trade?
When an international standard does not exist or a Member chooses
not to adopt the international standard, unless the alternative regulation
or procedure has a "significant effect on trade," there is no requirement
to specially notify the ISO or Secretariat of the deviation.' 2 A significant
105. TBT art. 2.5
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. TBT art. 2.9.2
109. TBT art. 5.4.
110. Id.
111. TBT art. 5.6.2.
112. TBT arts. 2.9, 5.6.
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effect on trade may be "in a specific product or group of products or
products in general."" 3  To determine the regulation's significance,
consideration is given to the value of the trade to other Members, the
potential growth of such imports, and the difficulties in complying with
the measure." 4 The legitimacy of the deviation may be questioned by
other Members, but the nation does not need to change its regulation to
comply with the comments." l5 Until a complaint is made to the Dispute
Resolution Panel, 1 6 the nation is not required to justify the regulation if
it claims it is necessary to protect human health or safety." 17 Since dispute
resolution carries with it both costs of money and time and implications
for goodwill with third party nations, there is a disincentive to bring a
complaint against any but the most blatant protective practices.'8
113. Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee since January 1,
1995, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, gltbt/1/rev.7, 16 (November 28, 2005).
114. Id.
115. TBTart.2.9.4.
116. In summary, dispute settlement litigation in the WTO starts when one country
brings a complaint to the WTO Secretariat. Consultations and/or mediations are
established between the two countries and, if necessary, a mediator from the WTO. This
process has a time limit of 60 days. Third party countries who demonstrate an interest in
the litigation are permitted to intervene. Once the countries involved have decided that
they cannot reach an agreement, a panel of experts is appointed to rule on the matter.
The countries then submit arguments, in written form, rebut those arguments. The panel
makes one interim ruling and submits it to the countries for argument. A final ruling is
then made within an approximately six month time limit. Once the panel has ruled, the
decision goes to the entire WTO body, and can be overturned if every nation, including
the "defendant," agrees it should. Panel rulings are automatically implemented, and if
the losing country does not comply, trade sanctions may be applied. Both parties have
the ability to appeal the panel decision to the WTO Appellate Body that reviews the
decision below. Since every step has statutory time limits, the whole process should take
less than one year and three months. DSU, supra note 67.
117. Id.
118. However, developed nations have demonstrated that they are willing to fight
for their IPRs in pharmaceuticals in the WTO by joining the Canada-Pharmaceuticals
decision. An unfavorable dispute resolution could have devastating effects for a
developing nation if it either brings a suit or responds to a suit. In particular, the costs of
defending and possibly losing a suit based on charges of pharmaceutical patent
infringement would not be limited to sanctions based on the patent infringement. In the
WTO, sanctions can extend to any part of trade, and not just the trade issue in dispute.
See Abbott, Doha, supra note 7. See also Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the
Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 523, 543 (2002) (for information on
the costs of patent litigation to developing countries and small entities).
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3. Dispute Resolution: Is There A Legitimate Objective?
Through dispute resolution, the reason for the technical regulation is
assessed to determine whether or not it fulfills a legitimate objective. A
legitimate objective under the TBT is not explicitly defined, but the
preamble lists acceptable reasons for discriminatory trade laws, such as
"for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health."" 9 The TBT
allows regulations or conformity assessment procedures to restrict trade
for "legitimate objectives" with little or no burden of proof to determine
that the objective is legitimate until litigation is initiated through the
dispute resolution process. 20  In the dispute resolution process the
reason for the conformity assessment procedure will be evaluated in
light of the reason given to justify its deviation from the accepted
international procedure. 121
4. Dispute Resolution: Is this the Least Trade Restrictive
Means, Taking Account of the Risks?
A legitimate objective should be "no more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking into account the risks
non-fulfilment would create.' 22  In this assessment, the Dispute
Settlement Panel analyzes the reason for the objective as proven by the
risks the nation will bear if the regulation is not followed, balanced
against how discriminatory the regulation is. The TBT suggests that the
nation's argument should be backed up at this point by some sort of
evidence, such as "available scientific and technical information, related
processing technology or intended end-users of products."' 123 There is no
119. TBTpmbl.
120. Id.
121. Conformity assessment procedures have not made it to the dispute resolution
panel, but the language is similar to that for technical regulations and so it is likely to be
analyzed the same way.
122. TBT art. 2.2.
123. Id. But see TRIPS art. 39.3 (where clinical data submitted to a regulatory
agency for a new drug submission is considered proprietary, and cannot be relied on for
the abbreviated new drug submission by a generic manufacturer to obtain approval).
This leads to an international standard, the TRIPS agreement, being restrictive on
countries that wish to allow reliance on clinical data, and choose to import into a country
who does not allow reliance on clinical data, arguably for reasons of human health. But
the rationale behind not relying on others' clinical data may be complicated by pressures
by the importing country's national pharmaceutical sector as well as government
regulatory safety policy. WHO Drug Information Vol. 19 No. 3 2005, Intellectual Property
Protection: Impact on Public Health 236, 238. It gets more complicated if the industry
member that the generic is hoping to compete with was the one who conducted the
clinical trials in a foreign country, perhaps for foreign marketing approval. See also
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS AND ASSOCIATIONS,
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specific burden of proof to establish that there is a legitimate objective,
only a line drawing situation.
124
Analysis of conformity assessment procedures differs from technical
regulations at this point. According to the TBT, conformity assessment
procedures should not prepare, adopt or apply a procedure to deny
access for suppliers of like products under conditions less favourable
than those granted the suppliers of that Member state or any other
state. 125 The TBT also endeavors to ensure that the regulatory process
embodied in a conformity assessment procedure is not applied to purposely
delay or prevent any particular nation's products from entering the
national market.1 26 Lastly, the TBT specifies that "the siting of facilities
used in conformity assessment procedures and the selection of samples
are not such as to cause unnecessary inconvenience to applicants or their
agents."' 127 These restrictions attempt to prevent any national favoritism
through easily foreseeable bureaucratic mechanisms. The question is
whether they are applicable to national pharmaceutical registrations to
prevent protectionist practices.
Since pharmaceutical regulatory requirements almost always fall
under human health and safety, such regulations will likely have a
decent argument that they fulfill a "legitimate objective" or adequate
reason. As the safety of a drug is never completely known, even when
approved,128 it may be easy to claim that acceptance of anything but the
"branded" sources makes the drug unsafe. 129 Unfortunately, the established
manufacturing companies with reputations for safety tend to be solely in
developed countries. If the regulation "significantly affects trade," the
Member is then required to notify the ISO and the Secretariat. 130 Only
truly discriminatory regulations in a normative sense are likely to be
brought under the TBT because each nation is permitted to maintain its
own standards. Yet the challenge is to determine how the regulation
GLOBAL INDUSTRY POSITION ON DISCLOSURE ABOUT CLINICAL TRIALS (Jan. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.ifpma.org/News/NewsReleaseDetail.aspx?nlD=2205.
124. The burden of proof is likely to be high, in Canada-Asbestos, the proof was
not sufficient to prove protectionist intent, though it may have proven protectionist
effects.
125. TBT arts. 5.1, 5.1.1.
126. TBT art. 5.2.1.
127. TBT art. 5.2.6.
128. FDA, supra note 35.
129. For instance, the REACH proposal establishes a branded source for all chemicals
in the EU, not only pharmaceuticals. REACH, supra note 41.
130. TBT art. 2.9.
affects trade in a protectionist manner, especially since there are minimal
proof requirements before litigation in the WTO. In effect, substantive
justification for the regulation's purpose to promote human health is
only mentioned when it noticeably will affect trade and another nation
institutes dispute resolution. 3' Only then must the defending party must
prove that its regulation fulfils a legitimate objective in light of the risks
involved and that it is the least restrictive means available.
V. ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINA-PHARMACEUTICALS
In May of 2001, India filed a request for consultations in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body against Argentina for discriminatory trade
practices related to Argentinean pharmaceutical regulatory law. 133 The
laws in question required that importing countries fall into one of two
Annexes of quality compliance. Annex 1 stipulated that (1) "all drugs and
other pharmaceuticals must be registered with the National Administration
of Drugs, Foodstuffs and Medical Technology under the Ministry/
Department of Health of Argentina;" and (2) the exporting manufacturer's
drugs must either "(a) be manufactured in facilities approved by the
relevant governmental bodies of these countries" or (b) in facilities
approved.134 In the Argentinean legislation, this Annex was followed by
a list of countries, which omitted India.
135
131. "The largest number of technical regulations and standards are adopted to aim
at protecting human safety or health." WTO website for the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tbt e/tbt info e.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2006).
132. TBT art. 2.2
133. Request for Consultations by India, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Import
of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS233/1 (May 30, 2001) [hereinafter Argentina-
Pharmaceuticals]. Since May of 2001 there has been no further information about this
suit. The analysis contained in this article is all hypothetically based on the limited facts
from the request for dispute resolution and application of previous WTO decisions and
the TBT structure. Because medicines have not been addressed in a manner outside
IPRs, all arguments are hypothetical.
134. The specific Argentinean laws cited in the complaint were, Law/Act No.
24.766 and Decrees No. 150/92 which was modified to No. 177/93 and can be found, in
Spanish, at: http://www.anmat.gov.ar/principal.htm [hereinafter ANMAT]. Other problems
with the Argentinean regulatory laws and procedures have already been disputed. The
United States previously brought a challenge against Argentina under TRIPS to enforce
the right to keep clinical data confidential, the right to process patents, the right to
preliminary injunctions and other concerns. See Request for Consultations by the United
States, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for
Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/1 (May 10, 1999) and Request for Consultations
by the United States, Argentina-Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents,
WT/DS196/1 (June 6, 2000). PhRMA's commentary on Argentinean pharmaceutical
practice suggests that the patent implications of 24.766 and its regulatory laws are not
acting together.
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India brought the complaint under the TBT for its substantive provisions,
the GATT to support Most Favoured Nation treatment, and the Agreement
Establishing the WTO to reinforce the conformity obligations of Member
countries. To succeed in its complaint under the TBT, India will have to
prove, that: (1) This regulation is a technical regulation or conformity
assessment procedure; (2) that this regulation/ conformity assessment
procedure has no equivalent in international standardizing agencies or that
it deviates from that provided by international standardizing agencies,'
36
(3) that the deviation significantly affects trade, (4) that the deviation of
these regulations does not fulfill a legitimate objective; (5) that the
measure is not justified in light of the risks of not having the measure;
and (6) the Argentinean law was more trade restrictive than necessary to
fulfill the legitimate interest of protecting human health. The following
is a hypothetical analysis of Argentina's regulations in light of the
TBT.
137
A. Are the Argentinean Regulations Either Technical Regulations
or Conformity Assessment Procedures?
Annex I of the Argentinean regulation requires that "all drugs and other
pharmaceuticals" be registered with Argentinean regulatory authority
and must meet that authority's "manufacturing and quality control
The Argentine government does not enforce the obligations in Law 24.766 that
prohibits the health agency (ANMAT) from approving a similar product to one
that has a valid patent. ANMAT regularly grants copy companies the authorization
to sell copy products of patented products or of products for which there is a
pending patent request. Lack of linkage between the Health Agency and the
Patent Office (INPI) is, therefore, a serious problem for PhRMA members.
Since INPI publishes all applications and granted patents, it should be
mandatory for this agency to communicate such information to ANMAT.
Considering that the Argentine Government refused to settle this portion of the
dispute with the U.S., we remain convinced that only a decision by the WTO
dispute settlement panel will induce change in Argentina.
PHRMA, PHRMA 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, http://intemational.phrma.org/intemational/
americas/centralamerica.cfm (last visited, Apr. 14, 2006). Since a challenge to the Argentinean
patent system, and by extension, regulatory system has already been brought, it is logical
that if the system was so burdensome on importing countries that a challenge would be
brought under other WTO provisions, such as the TBT.
135. Available at http://www.anmat.gov.ar/principal.htm. A simple solution to India's
complaint would be to add them to the list of accepted nations. But the legislation listed
on ANMAT still omits India.
136. TBT arts. 2, 2.2.
137. This article will not address analysis under the MFN provisions of GATT or
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, nor will it analyze the suit under the SPS.
requirements" regardless of where they are manufactured.138 It is clear
that the regulation identifies pharmaceutical products as a group,
deals with product characteristics and production methods, and
mandates compliance. 139 Under that standard it would be a technical
regulation. However, it is also a conformity assessment procedure,
because the law describes a registration process which determines
whether "relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards"
are met. 140 This regulation, therefore, should be analyzed as both a
technical regulation and a conformity assessment procedure.
B. Is There an Applicable International Standard or Procedure for
the Manufacturing and Testing of Drugs, and Does the Local
Standard Deviate from International Standards?
Whether there is an applicable international standard could be argued
in favor of either India or Argentina. India could argue that international
standards such as GMP are recognized as the gold standard for
manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and their quality control acceptable in
the developed world. 14 1 India should also claim that it intends to comply
with GMP provisions. 142 Argentina could reply that, despite the GMP
provisions, each nation has its own regulatory requirements, and that
GMP provisions are limited to the drug itself, not the registration
process. The requirement that the pharmaceuticals "meet the National
Health Authority's manufacturing and quality control requirements"
does deviate from the GMP standard for the production of drugs if this
requirement imposes more than GMP standard, but it is unclear how this
law is applied.
14 3
India could argue the law is facially neutral, but applied with a
protectionist intent and effect. There is evidence that Argentina does not
recognize the results of quality control testing performed by either the
United States or Europe, 4 but Argentina could reiterate that even the
138. Argentina-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 133.
139. See discussion of GMP supra part III A and IV D.
140. TBT annex I definition 3.
141. World Bank, supra note 11.
142. Since "the leading India drug companies derive most of their profits from sales
within the United States and other high income markets" it is plausible that India
has both the capacity and intention to import GMP compliant pharmaceuticals into
Argentina. Outterson, supra note 3, at 243.
143. The complaint is unclear how nations ended up in Annex I or Annex II.
144. PHRMA, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
(NTE) 181 (Dec. 12, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA Estimate] http://intemational.phrma.
org/intemational/americas/centmlamerica.cfm (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). "Argentina's National
Medications Institute (INAME) does not accept the results of quality control testing
performed by the U.S. or the European Union. New and redundant quality control tests
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United States and European Communities require duplicative testing. If
this is so, the deviation from international standards may be a question
of how the law is applied rather than what the law says. The TBT does
require that nations not apply their laws in an anticompetitive manner.
145
India could argue that Argentina has no valid reason for requiring
repeated testing from any of the Nations listed on the Annexes due to
reliable international standards, because if drugs from either the United
States or Europe are acceptable without retesting in other states, the
results should also be acceptable to Argentina.'46 Additionally, India
could repeat the PhRMA allegations that Argentina creates unnecessary
barriers and delays to marketing approval for imported pharmaceuticals. 
1 47
C. Does the Deviation Create a Significant Effect on Trade?
Whether a deviation creates a significant effect on trade is balanced by
the value of the trade to the members, the potential growth of the import
market, and how difficult it is for the applicant to comply with the
measure. 48  India could claim that its pharmaceutical industry is
must be preformed locally resulting in product launch delays and additional expenditures"
(emphasis added).
145. TBT art. 5.1.1. Members shall ensure that "conformity assessment procedures
are prepared, adopted and applied so as to grant access ... under conditions no less
favorable than those accorded to suppliers of like products of national origin or
originating in any other country" (emphasis added).
146. India is in the unique position of being both a very sympathetic plaintiff and
the world's best known patent infringer, depending on who is asked. Because India
supplies generic (and patented) drugs to developing nations under compulsory licenses
it has gained acclaim as being a pharmaceutical "Robin Hood" who steals from rich
PhRMA to give to poor developing nations in need. But legal writers blame India's
limited research capacity on their lax intellectual property regime and argue that the
lack of IPRs has resulted in an "inability to meet even the most rudimentary health
requirements," for its own population. Barbosa, supra note 52, at 243. See also Fink,
supra note 8, at 231.
147. PhRMA Estimate, supra note 144.
PhRMA Members continue to suffer from barriers due to restrictive import
policies, anticompetitive practices and the implementation of unnecessary
standards, testing, labeling and certification requirements .... The government of
Argentina imposes high import duties on pharmaceutical products. Overall
customs procedure requires supporting documentation and additional payment
of fees. In addition to prescription drugs, free samples and products for clinical
trials are also subject to import duties in Argentina. There are significant delays
due to bureaucratic proceedings.
Id. Whether PhRMA is a reliable or logical source for India to find support is a different
question.
148. See discussion, supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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important to its national economy. India might then argue that its main
export to Argentina is chemicals, yet it has almost no market share. 149
Argentina would likely reply that the market is not growing sufficiently
to outstrip its domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers which provide
pharmaceuticals at competitive prices.' 50 India might reply it cannot
participate at all, since they are not on the Annexes, and so any
pharmaceutical imports are a growth in the value of the market.'
5
'
D. Does the Deviation Fulfill a Legitimate Objective or Purpose?
If it were determined that the regulation deviates from the international
standard, the question would become whether the deviation fulfills a
"legitimate objective" or an acceptable reason. Argentina would most likely
claim that Argentinean government agency supervision of manufacturing
facilities is necessary to maintain strict safety levels. India could argue
that GMP procedures serve all the needs of a national registration
agency: that each step of the pharmaceutical's manufacture is recorded
and validated, that the quality of any given batch of pharmaceutical may
be easily ascertained through records, and that drugs which pose a
hazard may be easily tracked and recalled. 152 This would be a difficult
point to establish, since even the United States' FDA does not evaluate
drugs solely based on compliance with GMP standards. If India could
establish that all of its pharmaceutical exports are acceptable under the
most restrictive regulatory requirements on the planet that address safety, 153
then it could argue that for purposes of harmonization, its drugs should
be acceptable to Argentina.
149. In 2003 Argentina imported 25 percent of its nucleic acids and heterocyclic
acids from India, but significantly less than one percent of its pharmaceutical imports
came from India. NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRADE INFORMATION, REPORT: "INDIA &
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES-SECTOR WISE TRADE ANALYSIS," available at http://www.
ncti-india.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2006)(also available from author). This it notable,
because the purpose of nucleic acids is often for pharmaceutical research or production.
These statistics do not decisively indicate whether India is capable of competing at that
level in the market for consumer pharmaceuticals rather than precursors or research
reagents.
150. It is interesting to note that as of 1988, locally owned companies held 58 percent of
the pharmaceutical market share, up from 45 percent in 1977. Fink, supra note 8, at 254
n.4.
151. Supra note 149. India's pharmaceutical profit likely comes almost exclusively
from exports, as its population may not be able to pay the prices manufacturers can find
abroad. From India's general export data, it exports roughly six times the value of the
pharmaceuticals it imports. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF COMMERCIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
STATISTICS OF INDIA, INDIA'S FOREIGN TRADE BY CHAPTERS AND SECTIONS, Table 1,
Apr. to Sept. 2005, available at http://dgciskol.nic.in.
152. See the discussion of the European goals of GMP, supra, Part IV.D.
153. Such as those in the United States of America or Europe.
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To positively refute India's claims of equivalency, Argentina's best
option would be to offer physical proof of non-equivalence. This could
be proof of counterfeit products being introduced under an Indian
company's labels, or lack of bioequivalence in a sampled population
from those drugs provided to the United States and those provided to
Argentina. 154
E. Is the Measure Justified in Light of the Risks of
Not Having the Measure?
The TBT requires that, "in assessing such risks relevant elements of
consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical information,
related processing technology or intended end-uses of products."' 155 EC-
Hormones divided risk assessment into a two step process that "should
(i.) identify the adverse affects on human health (if any) arising from the
presence of [the law] ... and (ii.) if any adverse affects exist, evaluate
the potential of occurrence of such effects."' 156  This is not solely a
quantitative analysis, as the TBT envisions "not only risk ascertainable
in a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but
also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the
actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world."'' 57
If Argentina were to rely on risk to human health to provide a
legitimate purpose for its regulations, the best support for that purpose
would be actual reports of injuries resulting from drugs which were
inadequately screened by the Argentinean regulatory agency. If
Argentina had a history of counterfeit drugs damaging individuals, like
Brazil or Haiti have, then additional safety measures may be considered
154. The Argentinean regulatory agency may already have the evidence to establish
the inadequate quality of India's pharmaceutical exports. "Even the Indian government
has recognized that Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers continue to produce 'spurious,
substandard, and irrational products."' Susan Finson, India: A Cautionary Tale on the
Critical Importance of Intellectual Property Protection, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 891, 895 (2002), quoting The 4th Annual Report 1999-2000 of the Organization of
Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) at 6 (2000). This in contrast to the assertion
that much of the major Indian corporations' income comes from the United States or
other developed countries-which presumably require strict compliance with GMP.
Outterson, supra note 3, at 243.
155. TBT art. 2.2.
156. Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, 183, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/
AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). As related by Fidler, supra note 65, at 240.
157. Fidler, supra note 65, at 242.
necessary.158 Notably, Argentina would have to present significant, relevant,
scientifically backed and validated proof. These measures are only
preventative and there had not been any instances of counterfeiting
involving India in the past.
159
If the measures are precautionary, India could argue that other
countries do not require localized manufacturing despite the potential for
human harm. India would need to emphasize that internationally organized
and overseen inspections are sufficient in countries with the most
rigorous regulatory regimes. There is no reason for Indian manufacturing to
bear the burden of additional inspections by Argentineans. Argentina
could reply that it may still require additional inspections because the
United States and Europe do reserve the right to inspect any imported
drugs. 160  If the dispute resolution panel has already agreed that the
measures deviate from international norms, Argentina may not be able to
argue this point.
F. Is the Argentinean Law More Trade Restrictive Than
Necessary to Fulfill the Legitimate Interest of
Protecting Human Health?
To prevail, India would have to show discriminatory/protectionist
intent or effect. At first glance, the Argentinean regulations treat nations
differently, as shown by the lists of countries following the Annexes. 6 1
That India is not on either list indicates that it cannot participate in the
market at all, where other countries, such as the United States or many
of the European countries can. But the burden of proof is high for India:
it would have to show either that there was discriminatory intent in
creating the legislation-through legislative history or other commentary-
or that the effect is discriminatory.
India has a plausible argument for discriminatory effect, because
under the legislation, it cannot participate in Argentina's pharmaceutical
market at all. However, the lists of countries on the two Annexes are
158. Barbosa, supra note 52 (discussing Brazil and Haiti's troubles with counterfeit
pharmaceuticals).
159. The fact that India brought this case is particularly interesting because it is a
developing country which, by all accounts, is beginning to compete for a share of the
pharmaceutical market on an international stage. While its participation is presently
relatively limited to the generic drug market, it is beginning to have the capacity to
research and develop new drugs. Fink, supra note 8, at 231. Since it is a more recent
participant in international pharmaceutical markets, it may be reasonable to distrust
Indian standards of quality.
160. Outterson, supra note 3. See also REACH, supra note 41.
161. ANMAT, supra note 134.
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limited,162 so Argentina could argue that India needs to prove to its
regulatory agency that India markets safe and effective drugs before
Indian pharmaceutical manufacturers are allowed access to Argentinean
consumers. This legislation is more burdensome than the REACH
proposal, 163 which permits any country to produce chemicals and participate
in the market, yet re~uires registration and evaluation of those chemicals
for safety purposes.
India could request that it be given favorable treatment as a
developing country. Under Article 12 of the TBT, deference should
be given to a developing nation's abilities and resources.165 But it is
clear that the agreement only contemplates that one party to the
transaction is a developing nation. Article 12.3 says that Members shall
take into account the development, financial and trade needs of developing
nation when creating technical regulations and conformity assessment
procedures so as not to create an obstacle to trade to products from a
developing country. 16 6 Likewise, developing countries "should not be
expected to use international standards as a basis for their technical
regulations or standards ... which are not appropriate for their financial
or trade needs."' 167 Under these guidelines, Argentina merits leniency for
creating a standard that differs from the international norm, and India
merits leniency for not meeting that standard. Since both countries are
economically viable developing countries, it is arguable that these
provisions do not apply at all.68
162. A total of less than 30 countries are listed in the legislation. ANMAT, supra
note 134.
163. REACH, supra note 41.
164. Id.
165. TBT art 12.1. "Members shall provide differential and more favourable
treatment to developing country members." Id.
166. TBT art. 12.3.
167. TBT art. 12.6.
168. It could be argued that India should not be considered a developing nation
anymore at least for pharmaceutical exports, because it provides drugs to other nations
through compulsory licenses. It could also be argued that Argentina is in the same
position. The WTO provides: "There are no WTO definitions of "developed" and
"developing" countries. Members announce for themselves whether they are "developed"
or "developing" countries. However, other members can challenge the decision of a
member to make use of provisions available to developing countries." Who Are
Developing Countries in the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ devel
e/dlwho e.htm. The WTO cite refers readers to the United Nations to determine
whether "developing country" status applies. Id. There, both countries are given
preferential trade status by the United States and other countries. United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, New York & Geneva, Jan. 11, 2005, Generalized
G. Will India Succeed With its Claim?
India arguably has a very strong case for finding protectionist practices,
but any decision has many ramifications over a very large industry
whose policies are already spotlighted by concerns over human rights
and intellectual property. If India could successfully prove discriminatory
intent behind the statute, it should win. If India could establish that it
cannot access the market at all where other nations participate, and that
its manufacturers would be able to compete with safe effective drugs, it
should be able to establish there was a breach of the TBT.
India is not in the best position to bring this suit. If the United States
or the European Union were omitted from the law and brought this suit,
there would be a greater presumption that the drugs are safe and
effective, but Argentina would be able to gain deference through its
developing country status. Arguably, there is not a single WTO Member
who is in a strong position to bring this suit.
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR PROTECTIONIST
REGULATORY REGIMES
One solution to protectionist regulatory practices is international
harmonization for all regulatory requirements. Outterson argues that all
"national regimes for testing the safety and efficacy of patented drugs
are inefficient, duplicating scientific work and wasting resources
unnecessarily" because each new chemical entity requires clearance by
each national regulatory authority where the drug will be sold. He
suggests a "reference" approval process, where safety and efficacy of a
particular drug would be referenced against approval in certain benchmark
countries that WHO prequalification would satisfy bioequivalence for
generic drugs or good manufacturing practices, that IPRs would be
separated from drug marketing approvals, and where clinical trials
would not be repeated for generic drugs without a clear benefit to human
health. 169 With the advent of ICH and the WHO prequalification
project 170 there is movement towards a truly global standard of both drug
production and regulation. Unfortunately, the bar may be set at a level
that developing nations cannot reach with emerging pharmaceutical
manufacturers. It may also be difficult to achieve consensus as to the
System of Preferences: List of Beneficiaries 1, 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCDITSB/
Misc.62/Rev. 1, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6493
&intltemD = 1418&lang=1 &mode-downloads.
169. Outterson, supra note 3, at 237.
170. A project where dossiers on providers of certain essential drugs are tested and
approved for use around the world. Id.
[VOL. 8: 559, 2007] The WTO 's TBT and Pharmaceuticals
SAN DIEGO INTL L.J
particulars of the registration process, because each nation has its own
experience and needs.1 7' The expense to establish a truly international
drug regulatory agency suggests that its policies will be dominated by
those who paid for it, to the detriment of poorer nations. Pharmaceutical
regulations are not 'one size fits all' and it may be impossible to find a
workable middle ground that allows all nations to participate in the
international market. Though the TBT tries to recognize and support an
individual nation's needs, its general policy-based provisions may be too




Pharmaceuticals are particularly difficult to address under discriminatory
trade practices. Addressing non-competitive regulatory practices alone
will not be effective in assisting entry by lesser developed nations into
the international (or national as the case may be) pharmaceutical market
without assistance on other levels. At this time, while there has been no
indication whether the WTO would analyze pharmaceutical regulatory
requirements under the TBT, 173 it is unclear that discriminatory regulatory
regimes would be addressed adequately by any other agreement,
including the SPS.174 However, under the SPS the proof requirement for
the justification of the regulatory requirement would need to be backed
up by scientific evidence,' 75 and might prevent some of the more
discriminatory regulatory regimes.
171. Some nations may have experiences with particular drugs which have
drastically affected their regulatory requirements. For instance, extended pre-clinical
studies might be required for a disease model where the earliest drugs were shown to
have late-emerging heart complications. The current type of chemicals used to treat that
disease have been shown not to have this complication, yet the agency still requires an
extended pre-clinical study, delaying the approval of any new drugs for that disease.
Another nation may never have discovered that complication, or had determined that
they could shorten the study period and still avoid the complication and adjusted their
regulation accordingly.
172. See TBT art. 12 and discussion of how to analyze a dispute when both nations
are developing, supra note 165 and accompanying text.
173. www.wto.org (the website indicates that though it has been updated pursuant
to this request for dispute resolution as of January 5, 2007, there are no additional
documents). The lack of commentary on this decision may be notable, especially if this
topic is an issue of negotiations, under the Doha Round of negotiations, started in 2001.
174. Drexl, supra note 70.
175. WTO/WHO, supra note 87, at 37 39 (comparing the SPS and TBT and
concluding that the SPS can only apply to health measures which are based on a
Even if the TBT is the proper place to bring suits against
discriminatory regulatory processes in pharmaceuticals, this agreement
may not alleviate the burden of disease on least developed nations. It is
unrealistic to expect a least developed nation to successfully create its
own pharmaceutical industry in a short period of time. t76  Lesser
developed nations may have little government infrastructure and the
technology is complicated. The World Bank suggests that, "pharmaceutical
manufacturing should only be encouraged in countries that have an
effective control agency to enforce GMP. If this capacity is lacking, the
costs of building and upgrading a drug regulatory agency that can
oversee the industry effectively need to be considered in the overall
calculation."'
177
Additionally, the barriers to entry into the international pharmaceutical
market are being raised. For instance, the REACH Proposition adds new
registration requirements for all chemicals entering into the EU, regardless
of whether they have already been evaluated by an internationally
recognized standard previously accepted by the EU.178 Likewise, ICH is
progressing, and threatens to replace GMP guidelines with even higher
standards.' 79 Abbott suggests that as more lesser-developed nations become
able to compete with large pharma on an international scale for both
generic and new drug markets there will be "efforts to impose regulatory
restrictions designed to protect PhRMA. 180 If this comes to pass, then
analysis of pharmaceuticals and protectionist regulatory practices will be
at the forefront of the debate on how to supply pharmaceuticals to
developing nations. Until then, it is sufficient to recognize that there is a
need to highlight and discourage protectionist regulatory practices, and
try to determine the proper forum to address the most obvious offenses.
scientific justification, as opposed to the TBT which merely requires a "legitimate"
objective).
176. See discussion, supra, Part |I.A.
177. World Bank, supra note 11, at 2.
178. REACH, supra note 41.
179. EMEA guidelines on GMP has a new annex which was adopted to enact the
ICH guidelines, http://pharmacos.eudra.org. See discussion of ICH, supra, Part II.B.
180. Abbott, Hydra, supra note 30, at 423.
